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Wikileaks was born a century after President Th eod-
ore Roosevelt delivered the speech that gave muckrak-
ing journalism its name, and both hailed investigative 
journalism and called upon it to be undertaken respon-
sibly. In 2010, four years after its fi rst document release, 
Wikileaks became the center of an international storm 
surrounding the role of the individual in the networked 
public sphere. It forces us to ask how comfortable we are 
with the actual shape of democratization created by the 
Internet. Th e freedom that the Internet provides to net-
worked individuals and cooperative associations to speak 
their minds and organize around their causes has been 
deployed over the past decade to develop new, networked 
models of the fourth estate. Th ese models circumvent 
the social and organizational frameworks of traditional 
media, which played a large role in framing the balance 
between freedom and responsibility of the press. At the 
same time, the Wikileaks episode forces us to confront 
the fact that the members of the networked fourth estate 
turn out to be both more susceptible to new forms of at-
tack than those of the old, and to possess diff erent sources 
of resilience in the face of these attacks. In particular, 
commercial owners of the critical infrastructures of the 
networked environment can deny service to controversial 
speakers, and some appear to be willing to do so at a 
mere whiff  of public controversy. Th e United States gov-
ernment, in turn, can use this vulnerability to bring to 
bear new kinds of pressure on undesired disclosures in 
extralegal partnership with these private infrastructure 
providers.
Th e year of Wikileaks began with the release of a 
video taken by a U.S. attack helicopter, showing what 
sounded like a trigger-happy crew killing civilians along-
side their intended targets. It continued with two large-
scale document releases from Iraq and Afghanistan, 
about which Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote to 
the Senate, representing that “the review to date has not 
revealed any sensitive intelligence sources and methods 
compromised by this disclosure.” Th e year ended with the 
very careful release of a few hundred (as of this writing, 
it has risen to over 1900) cables from U.S. embassies in 
cooperation with fi ve traditional media organizations. At 
the time of the embassy cable release, about two-thirds 
of news reports incorrectly reported that Wikileaks had 
simply dumped over 250,000 classifi ed cables onto the 
Net. In fact, Wikileaks made that large number of ca-
bles available only privately, to the New York Times, the 
Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El Pais, and later 
to other media organizations. Th ese organizations put 
their own teams to work to sift through the cables and 
selected only a few, often in redacted form, to publish. 
Wikileaks then published almost solely those cables se-
lected by these traditional organizations, and only in the 
redacted form released by those organizations. Of this 
release, Secretary Gates stated: “Is this embarrassing? Yes. 
Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? 
I think fairly modest.”
Despite the steadily more cautious and responsible 
practices Wikileaks came to adopt over the course of 
the year, and despite the apparent absence of evidence of 
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harm, the steady fl ow of confi dential materials through 
an organization that was not part of the familiar “re-
sponsible press” was met by increasing levels of angry 
vitriol from the Administration, politicians, and media 
commentators. By the end of the year, U.S. Vice President 
Joseph Biden responded to the quite limited and careful 
release of the embassy cables by stating that Wikileaks 
founder Julian Assange is “more like a high-tech terrorist 
than the Pentagon Papers,” leading to predictable calls for 
his assassination--on the model of targeted killings of Al 
Qaeda and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan--by Fox News 
commentators and likely Republican presidential candi-
date Sarah Palin. Th e New York Times’ fl agship opinion 
author, Th omas Friedman, declared Wikileaks one of the 
two major threats to a peaceful world under U.S. leader-
ship, parallel to the threat of an ascendant China.
Th e rhetorical framing of Wikileaks in the socio-po-
litical frame of global threat and terrorism, in turn, facili-
tated and interacted with a range of responses that would 
have been inconceivable in the more factually appropriate 
frame of reference, such as what counts as responsible 
journalism, or how we understand the costs and benefi ts 
of the demise of more traditional models of journalistic 
self-regulation in the age of the networked public sphere. 
On the legal front, the Department of Justice responded 
to public calls from Senator Dianne Feinstein and others 
and began to explore prosecution of Julian Assange under 
the Espionage Act. 
Th e sociopolitical framing makes more comprehen-
sible the vigilante responses in other subsystems of the 
information environment. Responding to a call from 
Senate Homeland Security Committee Chairman Joe 
Lieberman, several commercial organizations tried to 
shut down Wikileaks by denial of service of the basic sys-
tems under their respective control. Wikileaks’ domain 
name server provider, EveryDNS, stopped pointing at the 
domain “wikileaks.org,” trying to make it unreachable. 
Amazon, whose cloud computing platform was hosting 
Wikileaks data, cut off  hosting services for the site, and 
Apple pulled a Wikileaks App from its App Store. Banks 
and payment companies, like MasterCard, Visa, PayPal, 
and Bank of America, as well as the Swiss postal bank, cut 
off  payment service to Wikileaks in an eff ort to put pres-
sure on the site’s ability to raise money from supporters 
around the world. Th ese private company actions likely 
responded to concerns about being associated publicly 
with “undesirables.” Th ere is no clear evidence that these 
acts were done at the direction of a government offi  cial 
with authority to coerce them. Th e sole acknowledged 
direct action was a public appeal for and subsequent 
praise of these actions by Senator Joe Lieberman. In that 
regard, these acts represent a direct vulnerability in the 
private infrastructure system and a potential pathway of 
public censorship. It is impossible to ignore the role that 
a diff use, even if uncoordinated, set of acts by govern-
ment offi  cials. In combination, the feedback from public 
to private action presents the risk of a government able 
to circumvent normal constitutional protections to crack 
down on critics who use the networked public sphere. 
Th is occurs through the infl uence of informal systems 
of pressure and approval on market actors who are not 
themselves subject to the constitutional constraints. Th is 
extralegal public-private partnership allows an admin-
istration to achieve, through a multi-system attack on 
critics, results that would have been practically impossible 
to achieve within the bounds of the Constitution and the 
requirements of legality.
Parts I and II tell the story of Wikileaks, the release 
of the documents, and the multi-system attack on the 
organization, the site, and Julian Assange by both public 
and private actors. Part III explores the ways in which 
the Wikileaks case intersects with larger trends in the 
news industry. In particular, what we see is that the new, 
networked fourth estate will likely combine elements of 
both traditional and novel forms of news media; and that 
“professionalism” and “responsibility” can be found on 
both sides of the divide, as can unprofessionalism and 
irresponsibility. Th e traditional news industry’s treatment 
of Wikileaks throughout this episode can best be seen as 
an eff ort by older media to preserve their own identity 
against the perceived threat posed by the new, networked 
model. As a practical result, the traditional media in the 
United States eff ectively collaborated with parts of the 
Administration in painting Wikileaks and Assange in 
terms that made them more susceptible to both extralegal 
and legal attack. More systematically, this part suggests 
that the new, relatively more socially-politically vulnera-
ble members of the networked fourth estate are needlessly 
being put at risk by the more established outlets’ eff orts 
to denigrate the journalistic identity of the new kids on 
the block to preserve their own identity.
I. Th e Provocation: Wikileaks Emerges as a New 
Element of the Fourth Estate
2006-2009: Award-Winning Site Exposing Corruption 
and Abuse Around the World
Wikileaks registered its domain name in October of 
2006 and released its fi rst set of documents in December 
of that year. Th e fi rst two sets of documents related to 
Africa. In December 2006, the site released a copy of 
a decision by the rebel leader in Somalia to assassinate 
Somali government offi  cials. In August 2007, it released 
another document identifying corruption by Kenyan 
leader Daniel Arap Moi. November of 2007 was the fi rst 
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time that Wikileaks published information relating to the 
U.S.: a copy of Standard Operating Procedures for Camp 
Delta, exposing a formal source outlining the details of 
how the Guantanamo Bay detention camp was run. In 
2008, Wikileaks released a wide range of documents 
related to illegal activities of public and private bodies. 
On the private side, these included a Swiss bank’s Cay-
man Islands account, internal documents of the Church 
of Scientology, and Apple’s iPhone application developer 
contract, which had included an agreement not to discuss 
the restrictive terms. On the public side, it included U.S. 
military rules of engagement in Iraq permitting pursuit of 
former members of Saddam Hussein’s government across 
the border into Iran and Syria, an early draft of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), emails from 
Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! accounts while she was a candidate 
for Vice President, and a membership list of the far-right 
British National Party. Most prominently, Wikileaks 
released documents pertaining to extra-judicial killings 
and disappearances in Kenya, for which it won Amnesty 
International’s New Media award in 2009. Wikileaks also 
received the Freedom of Expression Award from the Brit-
ish magazine Index of Censorship in the category of new 
media. Wikileaks’ activity increased in 2009. Th e pattern 
of releasing information relating to a range of very diff er-
ent countries, and to potential corruption, malfeasance, 
or ineptitude continued, including oil-related corruption 
in Peru, banking abuses in Iceland, and a nuclear accident 
in Iran. Most prominent that year was Wikileaks’ release 
of copies of e-mail correspondence between climate sci-
entists, which was the basis of what right-wing U.S. me-
dia tried to turn into “Climategate.” What seems fairly 
clear from this brief overview of activities prior to 2010 
is that Wikileaks was an organization that seems to have 
functioned very much as it described itself: a place where 
documents that shed light on powerful governments or 
corporations anywhere in the world, or, in the case of the 
climate scientists’ emails, on a matter of enormous global 
public concern, could be aired publicly.
March 2010: Leaking the 2008 Pentagon Report on the 
Th reat of Wikileaks
Th ings changed in 2010. In March 2010, Wikileaks re-
leased a 2008 Pentagon report arguing that Wikileaks is 
a threat, while recognizing the site as a source of inves-
tigative journalism critical of U.S. military procurement 
and its conduct in war. Th e New York Times, describing 
Wikileaks as “a tiny online source of information and 
documents that governments and corporations around 
the world would prefer to keep secret,” reported that 
the Army confi rmed the authenticity of the report. Th e 
Pentagon Report provides signifi cant insight into what 
Wikileaks was doing by 2008, and why the military was 
concerned about it.
Mixing its own assessments with Wikileaks self-
descriptions taken at face value, the Report describes 
Wikileaks as founded by “Chinese dissidents, journal-
ists, mathematicians, and technologists from the United 
States, China, Taiwan, Europe, Australia, and South 
Africa,” and dedicated “to exposing unethical practices, 
illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corpora-
tions and oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet 
bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.” 
Th e recognition of the journalistic role Wikileaks plays 
is clear in the discussion of several examples of Wikileaks 
publications, which the Report repeatedly describes as 
“news articles” and in the description of Julian Assange 
as the organization’s “foreign staff  writer.” In the process 
of describing what the Report’s authors consider a risk of 
misinformation campaigns, they identify several articles 
that Wikileaks published that rely on leaked Pentagon 
documents about equipment deployed in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. A major part of the concern is that opponents 
of the U.S. could use some of this information, released in 
2007, to plan attacks on U.S. troops. Th ere is no mention 
of any evidence of such actual use or feasible action in the 
Report. Instead, the Report mentions several disclosures 
and arguments about weapons systems deployed in Iraq 
and critiques of their high expense, low eff ectiveness, and 
in the case of chemical weapons, illegality. 
Th is characterization of the threat of excessive open-
ness appears to be either a misunderstanding driven by 
the “Wiki” part of the name or deliberate mischaracteri-
zation. Promiscuous publication by anyone of anything 
was not the model that Wikileaks adopted, although that 
model was far from unheard of at the time. A contem-
poraneous report by the Los Angeles Times compares 
Wikileaks to another then-operating site, Liveleak: “Live-
Leak has a simple editorial philosophy: Anyone can post 
anything that does not violate the site’s rules. Essentially, 
no pornography and nothing overtly criminal.” By con-
trast, “Wikileaks ... goes out of its way to make sure the 
documents it posts are authentic, saying fewer than 1% 
of its newly posted documents ‘fail verifi cation.’” From 
the vantage point of early 2011, this policy seems to have 
been consistently followed and remarkably successful. 
After over four years in operation, Wikileaks has been 
criticized for many faults, but none of its signifi cant post-
ings were found to be inauthentic.
Th e report concludes with a recommendation for at-
tacking the site: cracking down very heavily on whistle-
blowers so as to make Wikileaks seem less safe as a point 
of distribution.
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April-October 2010: Collateral Murder, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq
April 2010 marked the beginning of a series of four re-
leases of documents embarrassing to the U.S. govern-
ment. All four releases are thought to originate from a 
single major transfer of documents, allegedly provided 
by a twenty-two-year-old Private First Class in the U.S. 
Army, Bradley Manning. Th e fi rst release was a video en-
titled “Collateral Murder.” On July 12, 2007, two Apache 
attack helicopters fi red on a group of individuals in Iraq, 
killing about twelve. Among the dead were two Reuters 
employees: a photographer and a driver. Reuters tried to 
get access to the video footage from the helicopter itself, 
so as to investigate what had happened and whether there 
was indeed a threat to the helicopters that would have ex-
plained the shooting. Th e U.S. government successfully 
resisted information requests for recordings of the events. 
Wikileaks made available both the full, raw video and an 
edited version on April 5, 2010. In it, and in its sound-
track, the helicopter pilots exhibit trigger-happy behavior 
and sound as though they took pleasure in hunting down 
their targets, some of whom appear to be unarmed civil-
ians. Th e video and its contents became front-page news 
in the major papers. Th e release of the video was swiftly 
followed by identifi cation of Manning as the source of 
the leak, based on selectively-released chat messages he 
allegedly wrote to Adrian Lamo, a hacker convicted of 
felony hacking in 2004, who had longstanding contacts 
with a Wired Magazine reporter to whom he conveyed 
these chat messages. As of this writing, Manning has 
been in solitary confi nement for over eight months, de-
nied pillows and sheets, and locked in a cell for twenty-
three hours a day. Th e treatment seems consistent with 
the Pentagon Report’s emphasis on deterrence against 
potential sources of leaks as the core tactic to undermine 
Wikileaks.
Th e Collateral Murder video was released at a news 
conference in the National Press Club in Washington, 
D.C. Th is was the fi rst move that Wikileaks made toward 
the cooperation with traditional media that would mark 
its operation in the following eight months. At that early 
stage, however, Wikileaks was only using the established 
press as a mechanism for amplifying its message. 
In July 2010, Wikileaks released a new cache of 
documents--war logs from the fi eld in Afghanistan. Th e 
technique here represented a completely new model. Be-
fore publication, Wikileaks teamed up with three major 
international news organizations: the New York Times, 
the Guardian, and Der Spiegel. Th e major organizations 
were then given a period to verify the contents, analyze 
them, and prepare them for presentation. All four organi-
zations published on the same day: Wikileaks, a much 
larger portion of the full database of documents, and the 
news organizations, their analysis. Th e reporting on these 
documents found nothing that, in broad terms, was not 
already publicly known: the degree to which the U.S. was 
deploying targeted assassinations against Taliban lead-
ers, and the large number of civilian casualties caused by 
drone attacks and other coalition activities. Th e drudgery 
of war, low levels of trust between U.S. and Afghan of-
fi cials and forces--all of this was on display. Th e precision 
and detail of the incident descriptions--such as the shoot-
ing of eight children in a school bus by French troops, 
or of fi fteen civilians on a bus by U.S. troops--added 
concrete evidence and meaning to a background sense of 
futility and amorphous knowledge of civilian casualties. 
Th e Afghanistan war logs release initially included about 
77,000 documents; another 15,000 documents later fol-
lowed after they were initially held back to allow time for 
Wikileaks to redact names of people who might be put in 
danger. Th e release was treated with consternation by the 
Administration, and the New York Times’ initial story 
quoted National Security Advisor General James Jones 
as saying that the U.S. strongly condemns the disclosure 
of classifi ed information by individuals and organizations 
which could put the lives of Americans and our partners 
at risk, and threaten our national security. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Admiral 
McMullen, was reported as having said that Wikileaks 
would have blood on its hands. Following a full review, 
however, and in response to a direct request from Sena-
tor Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Secretary Gates later represented that “the 
review to date has not revealed any sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods compromised by the disclosure.” 
McClatchy later quoted an unnamed Pentagon source 
confi rming that three months later there was still no evi-
dence that anyone had been harmed by information in 
the Afghan war logs released.
In October, Wikileaks added one more major release. 
It consisted of war logs similar to those released in July, 
this time pertaining to the Iraq war. Here, Wikileaks 
posted close to 400,000 fi eld reports from Iraq in what 
the BBC described as “a heavily censored form.” Th e New 
York Times framed the documents as having relatively 
low signifi cance: “Like the fi rst release, some 77,000 re-
ports covering six years of the war in Afghanistan, the 
Iraq documents provide no earthshaking revelations, but 
they off er insight, texture and context from the people 
actually fi ghting the war.” Other news organizations 
framed the reports quite diff erently. Der Spiegel entitled 
the reports A Protocol of Barbarity. Th e BBC used the 
headline: Huge Wikileaks release shows US ‘ignored Iraq 
torture.’ Regardless of framing diff erences, the organiza-
10 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK  A FREE IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS
tions agreed on the core facts established by the reports: 
Iraqi civilian casualties were higher than previously re-
ported; the U.S. military was well aware that Iraq’s mili-
tary and police were systematically torturing prisoners; 
and while discrete units intervened to stop such torture 
on the ground, there was no systematic eff ort to stop 
the practice. Th e Pentagon denounced the release as a 
“travesty” and demanded the return of the documents. 
Secretary of State Clinton was quoted as saying, “We 
should condemn in the most clear terms the disclosure.”
Th is round of document release was also done by re-
lease to media outlets fi rst, but one way in which this 
round was diff erent was the introduction of personal at-
tacks on Julian Assange. Th e day after the release, the 
New York Times published a derogatory profi le of As-
sange entitled, Wikileaks Founder on the Run, Trailed 
by Notoreity. 
 All the elements of the profi le of an untrustworthy, 
shifty character are presented in a breathless tone. Here 
perhaps is the fi rst textual evidence of the major transi-
tion in the perception of Wikileaks in mainstream U.S. 
media. In March 2010, the Times had described Wikile-
aks as Th e Little Engine Th at Could of new media muck-
raking journalism. By mid-December, Wikileaks would 
come to be described by Tom Friedman on the Times’ 
op-ed page as one of two threatening alternatives to a 
strong, democratic America, alongside an authoritarian 
China. In between these two descriptions of Wikileaks, 
the Times’ profi le of Assange marks the transition point.
Th e Last Straw: Th e Embassy Cables
November 28, 2010 ushered in the next document re-
lease. Th is release was more careful and selective than 
any of the prior releases. Apparently, the caution came 
too late. Th e release of the fi nal batch was followed by a 
massive escalation of attacks on Wikileaks as an organi-
zation and website and on Assange as an individual. It is 
the mismatch between what Wikileaks in fact did in this 
fi nal round and the multi-system attack on it that drives 
the need for a deeper explanation.
Th e release of the State Department embassy cables 
(confi dential internal communications from embassies to 
Washington) was the most professionally-mediated, con-
servatively-controlled release Wikileaks had undertaken. 
Th e document set included 251,287 cables. Unlike the 
previous document releases, this time Wikileaks worked 
almost exclusively through established media organiza-
tions. It made the documents available to the Guardian, 
Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El Pais; the Guardian made 
the documents available to the New York Times. Wikile-
aks also sought advice from the U.S. State Department, 
just as the New York Times had, to aid in redaction and 
to help it avoid causing damage. Unlike the State De-
partment’s response to the traditional media organiza-
tions, Wikileaks’ letter was met with a strongly-worded 
letter from the Department’s legal advisor, Harold Koh, 
stating, “We will not engage in a negotiation regarding 
the further release or dissemination of illegally obtained 
U.S. Government classifi ed materials” and demanding 
that Wikileaks simply not publish anything, return all 
documents, and destroy all copies in its possession. Th is, 
despite the fact that the date of the letter is one day be-
fore revelation, and the text of the letter explicitly states 
that the State Department knew of and consulted with 
the mainstream news organizations that were about to 
publish the materials, and therefore that if Wikileaks 
were to return all the materials, the other media enti-
ties would have the freedom and professional obligation 
to publish the materials. Later reports from Wikileaks’ 
media partners support the observation that the Obama 
Administration treated Wikileaks as though it were in a 
fundamentally diff erent category than it did the newspa-
pers. Wikileaks then proceeded to make publicly acces-
sible on its own website cables that had been published by 
at least one of these media organizations, in the redacted 
form that those outlets had published. Despite the actual 
care and coordinated release model that Wikileaks in 
fact practiced, over 60% of print news reports at the time 
explicitly stated that Wikileaks had released thousands 
of documents (usually over 250,000), and another 20% 
implied that it did so. In fact, over the course of the fi rst 
month and more, the site released a few hundred docu-
ments, limited almost exclusively to those published and 
redacted by other organizations.
Th e contents of the overwhelming majority of released 
cables ranged from the genuinely important (e.g., Saudi 
and Gulf state support for a U.S. led attack on Iran to 
prevent proliferation; Yemeni acquiescence in U.S. bomb-
ing on its own territory; U.S. spying on UN staff ; U.S. 
intervention in Spanish, German, and Italian prosecution 
processes aimed at U.S. military and CIA personnel over 
human rights abuses of citizens of those countries; the 
known corruption and ineptitude of Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai) to the merely titillating (Libyan leader 
Muammar Gadaffi  ’s Ukrainian nurse described as “vo-
luptuous blonde”). Although none broke ground in a way 
that was likely to infl uence U.S. policy in a fundamental 
way, this was not always true of other countries. Th e 
most ambitious speculations, in the New York Times and 
Foreign Policy, suggested that Wikileaks’ cables’ blunt 
descriptions of the corruption of Tunisian President Ben 
Ali helped fuel the revolution that ousted him in January 
2011. Whether anything so fundamental can indeed be 
attributed to the embassy cables leak is doubtful, but the 
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sheer range of issues and countries touched, and continu-
ous media attention for two months, make it undeniable 
that the Wikileaks U.S. embassy cable release was a major 
news event that captured headlines all over the world 
for weeks, providing a steady fl ow of small to mid-sized 
revelations about the U.S. in particular and the world of 
high diplomacy more generally. It was a major scoop, or, 
as the Guardian put it proudly, “the world’s biggest leak.”
Despite the generally benign character of the cables, 
one cable, one response to a cable, and one threat to re-
lease all raise particular concerns about potential damage. 
Th e cable that raised the greatest concern was a February 
2009 cable listing “Critical Foreign Dependencies Initia-
tive List,” which listed specifi c facilities whose disruption 
would harm U.S. interests. Th ese ranged from a Man-
ganese mine in Gabon and undersea communications 
cables in China, to a pharmaceutical plant in Melbourne, 
Australia and a Danish supplier of pediatric form in-
sulin. Unlike the overwhelming majority of cables, this 
one appears to have been released initially by Wikileaks. 
Th e argument against this release, made at the time by 
the U.S. government, was that it off ered a target list for 
terrorists seeking to disrupt critical global supplies by 
rendering critical dependencies transparent. Th e second 
cable, or rather response to a cable, included a reference 
to Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s pri-
vate support for sanctions against the Mugabe regime in 
Zimbabwe, providing an excuse for the Mugabe regime 
to explore prosecuting Tsvangirai for treason. It appears 
that this cable, like the majority of cables, was published 
at the same time (and likely in coordination with) the 
Guardian. Furthermore, it is unclear whether use of the 
cable as an excuse by a repressive regime to prosecute 
or threaten its lead opponent is equivalent to revealing 
names of unknown human rights workers, much less un-
dercover operatives, who would not otherwise be known 
to the regime. Finally, in anticipation of the pressure, 
arrest, and potential threats of assassination, Julian As-
sange threatened to release a “poison pill,” a large cache of 
encrypted documents that is widely replicated around the 
Net and that would be decrypted, presumably with harm-
ful consequences to the U.S., should he be arrested or as-
sassinated. Th is latter of the three events is the one most 
foreign to the normal course of democratic investigation 
and publication. Depending on the contents of the fi le, 
it could be a genuinely distinct, threatening event, and 
publication of the decryption key may be an appropriate 
target for suppression consistent with First Amendment 
doctrine that permits constraining disclosure of “the sail-
ing dates of transports or the number and location of 
troops.” It is doubtful, however, that the contents of the 
insurance fi le would fall under that category, assuming 
that the entire set of cables is not fundamentally diff erent 
from those that were released and recognizing that none 
of the cables were classifi ed in top-secret categories.
II. Th e Response: A Multi-System Attack on 
Wikileaks
Th e response to the Wikileaks embassy cable release in 
the United States was dramatic and sharp. Th e integrated, 
cross-system attack on Wikileaks, led by the U.S. govern-
ment with support from other governments, private com-
panies, and online vigilantes, provides an unusually crisp 
window into the multi-system structure of freedom and 
constraint in the networked environment and helps us to 
map the emerging networked fourth estate. Th e attack’s 
failure provides us with insight into how freedom of action 
is preserved primarily by bobbing and weaving between 
systems to avoid the constraints of those subsystems under 
attack and harness the aff ordances of those that are out 
of reach of the attacker. Th e response also highlights the 
challenges that a radically decentralized global networked 
public sphere poses for those systems of control that devel-
oped in the second half of the twentieth century to tame 
the fourth estate--to make the press not only “free,” but 
also “responsible.” Doing so allows us to understand that 
the threat represented by Wikileaks was not any single 
cable, but the fraying of the relatively loyal and safe rela-
tionship between the U.S. government and its watchdog. 
Nothing captures that threat more ironically than the 
spectacle of Judith Miller, the disgraced New York Times 
reporter who yoked that newspaper’s credibility to the 
Bush Administration’s propaganda campaign regarding 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the 
Iraq War, using Fox News as a platform to criticize Julian 
Assange for neglecting the journalist’s duty of checking 
his sources and instead providing raw cables to the public. 
Th e criticism is particularly ironic in light of the fact that 
despite all the attacks on the cables’ release, the arguments 
were never that the cables were inauthentic.
It is important to emphasize that the myriad forms 
of attack on Wikileaks that I describe are unlikely to 
represent a single coordinated response by an all-knowing 
Administration bent on censorship. Mostly, they appear 
to represent a series of acts by agents, both public and 
private, that feed into each other to produce an eff ect 
that is decidedly inconsistent with the kind of freedom 
of the press and freedom of speech to which the United 
States is committed. Th at no distinct attack pattern that 
I describe clearly violates Wikileaks’ constitutional rights 
as against the state is no salve; indeed, it is precisely the 
vulnerability to destructive attacks, none of which is in 
itself illegal but that together eff ectively circumvent the 
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purposes of constitutionality and legality that requires 
our attention.
Sociopolitical Framing: Situating Wikileaks in the 
Frame of the War on Terror
Th e political attack on Wikileaks as an organization 
and on Julian Assange as its public face was launched 
almost immediately upon release of the cables. Th eir de-
fi ning feature was to frame the event not as journalism, 
irresponsible or otherwise, but as a dangerous, anarchic 
attack on the model of the super-empowered networks 
of terrorism out to attack the U.S. Th e fi rst salvo was 
fi red by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who stated, 
“Let’s be clear: Th is disclosure is not just an attack on 
America’s foreign policy interests... . It is an attack on the 
international community--the alliances and partnerships, 
the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global 
security and advance economic prosperity.” Th e trope of 
an attack on the international community provided the 
backdrop for a series of comments aimed at delegitimiz-
ing Wikileaks and locating it in the same corner, in terms 
of threats to the United States, as global terrorism. Th is 
was the backdrop for Vice President Biden’s statement 
that Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is “more like a 
high-tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers.” Th is as-
sessment was not uniformly supported by the Adminis-
tration. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the public 
response “overwrought”.
Th e invitation by Secretary Clinton and Vice Presi-
dent Biden to respond to dissemination of confi dential 
information as an assault on our national pride and 
integrity, on par with terrorism, was complemented by 
calls to use the techniques that the U.S. has adopted in 
its “War on Terror” against Julian Assange or Wikileaks 
as a site. Bob Beckel, the Fox News commentator who 
had been a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the 
Carter Administration and had been campaign manager 
to Walter Mondale, said, “’A dead man can’t leak stuff  ... 
. Th is guy’s a traitor, he’s treasonous, and he has broken 
every law of the United States. And I’m not for the death 
penalty, so ... there’s only one way to do it: illegally shoot 
the son of a bitch.’” Th is proposal was met with universal 
agreement by the panel on the program. Republican Rep-
resentative Pete King, then-incoming Chairman of the 
House Homeland Security Committee, sought to have 
Wikileaks declared a foreign terrorist organization. 
While the Obama Administration has renounced 
torture, it has embraced targeted killings as a legitimate 
part of its own war on terror, and chosen as a matter of 
stated policy to turn a blind eye to the illegality of the 
Bush Administration’s torture program. As a result, these 
continue to be options that can be publicly proposed by 
major public outlets and speakers. Th ey remain part of 
the legitimate range of options for discussion.
It is unthinkable that the U.S. will in fact assassinate 
Assange. But the range of actions open to both govern-
ment and non-government actors is in important ways 
constrained by our understanding of the social frame, 
or social context in which we fi nd ourselves. Th e legal 
options that the Justice Department thinks about when 
confronted with a case of a journalist who publishes sen-
sitive materials are fundamentally diff erent than those it 
thinks about when it is developing a prosecution strategy 
against terrorism suspects. Th e pressure to cut off  pay-
ment systems fl ows is fundamentally diff erent when con-
sidering whether to cut off  payments to a politically odi-
ous group than when considering cutting off  payments to 
a terrorist organization. It is very diffi  cult to understand 
the political and market dynamics that could have led to 
the decision by MasterCard and Visa to cut off  payments 
to Wikileaks except against the background of the fram-
ing eff orts that located Wikileaks in the same rubric as 
the Taliban, rather than the same rubric as the New York 
Times or the Progressive. 
Traditional media outlets provided substantial sup-
port for the Administration’s framing by exaggerating 
the number of cables and implying a careless approach 
to their release. A study of major print newspaper sto-
ries that mentioned the quantity of cables during the fi rst 
two weeks after the November 28th release shows that 
a substantial majority of newspapers stated as fact that 
Wikileaks had “released”, “published”, or “posted on its 
site”, “thousands” or “over 250,000” cables. About 20% of 
the stories in major newspapers were clear and accurate on 
the question of how many cables were released at that time 
and how vetted and redacted the published cables were. 
Sources of Resilience of the Networked Fourth Estate, 
and Th eir Limits
Despite the multi-system assaults it sustained, Wikile-
aks continued to operate throughout the period follow-
ing release of the cables, and its supporters continued to 
function and indeed respond to the attack along many di-
mensions. Just as the attacks provide insight into the ways 
in which human practice involves action in and through 
multiple intersecting systems, so, too, do the responses.
Th e fi rst and most obvious feature of the operation of 
Wikileaks is its presence outside the jurisdiction of the af-
fected country – the United States. Even if U.S. law were 
to permit shutting down the site or arresting Julian As-
sange, that alone would be insuffi  cient. Th e fact that the 
actors and servers are in other countries, and in particular, 
in countries with strong rights protecting whistleblowers-
-initially Iceland and later Sweden--provided Wikileaks 
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with a degree of robustness against the most predictable 
legal attacks. Th e defense is, of course, only as strong as 
the self-imposed limits of potentially off ended countries 
on applying extra-territorial jurisdiction, and the degree 
to which the host countries are, or are not, susceptible to 
legal process or diplomatic pressure.
Th roughout the events, Assange and Wikileaks em-
phasized their role as journalists. Inverting the practices 
of those who sought to analogize Wikileaks to terrorists, 
some commentators and reporters emphasized the basic 
argument that Wikileaks is a reporting organization, ful-
fi lling a reporting function. 
Perhaps the most important strategic choice of 
Wikileaks in this case was to release through several es-
tablished news sites in diff erent jurisdictions and markets. 
Th is approach achieved several things. First, it provided 
accreditation for the materials themselves. Second, of-
fering the materials to several organizations meant that 
no single organization could, acting alone, suppress the 
cables. Competition for the scoop drove publication. 
Th ird, it located Wikileaks squarely within the “jour-
nalist,” and even “responsible established media” rubric. 
Th is eff ort failed, at least in the public framing of the 
release, although it may yet play a role in the decision as 
to whether to prosecute anyone at Wikileaks. By harness-
ing the established fourth estate to its materials, Wikile-
aks received accreditation and attention, and was able to 
exercise power over the public sphere well beyond what 
it could have commanded by a single document dump 
on its own site, or an edited set of its own. By releasing 
an exclusive scoop to major outlets in diff erent global 
markets, it was able to create enough exclusivity to make 
publication commercially valuable to each of the news 
organizations in their respective markets, and enough 
competition to prevent any organization from deciding, 
in the name of responsibility, not to publish at all, or, as 
the Times did in the case of the NSA eavesdropping re-
port, to delay publication for a year. Doing so also solved 
the problem of how to sift through these vast amounts of 
data without having to harness a large army of volunteers, 
thereby defeating the purpose of releasing carefully so as 
not to harm innocent bystanders. 
On the larger, longer-term scale, another important 
response during the fi rst month following the release of 
the embassy cables was mutation and replication. Some 
former Wikileaks members announced creation of a par-
allel organization, OpenLeaks, intended to receive leaks 
and release them solely to subscribing NGOs and me-
dia organizations. A completely separate organization, 
Brussels Leaks, was launched to provide leaks specifi -
cally regarding the EU Commission. Both organizations 
plan to institutionalize in their structure the strategy that 
Wikileaks rapidly evolved over the course of 2010--the 
dedication to release through the mediation of “legiti-
mate” real world organizations, both media and NGOs. 
A month later, Al Jazeera launched (and the New York 
Times was considering launching) its own copy of 
Wikileaks, a secure platform for decentralized submis-
sion of leaked documents. Al Jazeera’s Transparency Unit 
was launched with the leaked “Palestine Papers.” To the 
extent that the campaign against Wikileaks was intended 
not to quash the specifi c documents, but to tame the 
beast of distributed online systems providing avenues for 
leaking documents outside of the traditional responsible 
media system, the emergence of these new sites suggests 
that the social and cultural phenomenon of distributed 
leaking is too resilient to be defeated by this type of at-
tack. Reporting based on documents leaked securely on-
line and using multiple overlapping systems to reach the 
public and evade eff orts at suppressing their publication 
is here to stay.
Th e Response to Wikileaks: Wrap Up.
Th e response to Wikileaks was dramatic, extensive, over-
wrought, and ineff ective. If the purpose was to stop access 
to the cables, it failed. If the eff ort was to cast a doubt on 
the credibility of the cables, it failed. If the purpose was to 
divert attention from the cables, it failed. And if the eff ort 
was to prevent the future availability of decentralized dis-
semination of leaked documents outside of the confi nes 
of the responsible press, it failed. Indeed, it is possible 
that, had Secretary Clinton adopted the same stance as 
Secretary Gates and shrugged off  the events as embar-
rassing, but not fundamentally destructive, a measured 
response to Wikileaks could have signifi cantly advanced 
the State Department’s Internet freedom agenda by al-
lowing the United States to exhibit integrity and congru-
ence between its public statements in support of Internet 
freedom and its actions. Th e actual response will create a 
visible incongruity should the State Department continue 
to assert Internet freedom as a major policy agenda.
Part III. From Mass-Mediated to Networked 
Fourth Estate
Th e attack on Wikileaks, in particular the apparent fear 
of decentralization that it represents, requires us to un-
derstand the current decline of the traditional model of 
the press and the emergence of its new, networked form. 
At core, the multi-system attack on Wikileaks, including 
mass media coverage and framing, is an expression of 
anxiety about the changes that the fourth estate is un-
dergoing. Th is anxiety needs to be resisted, rather than 
acted upon, if we are to preserve the robust, open model 
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of news production critical to democracy in the face of 
economic and technological change.
Th e Crisis of the Mass-Mediated Fourth Estate
Th e American fourth estate is in the midst of a profound 
transformation, whose roots are in the mid-1980s, but 
whose rate, intensity, and direction have changed in the 
past decade. Th e fi rst element of this transformation in-
cludes changes internal to the mass media--increasing 
competition for both newspapers and television channels, 
and the resulting lower rents to spend on newsrooms, and 
the fragmented markets that drove new strategies for dif-
ferentiation. Many of the problems laid at the feet of the 
Internet--fragmentation of the audience and polarization 
of viewpoints, in particular--have their roots in this ele-
ment of the change. Th e second element of transforma-
tion was the adoption of the Internet since the mid-1990s. 
Th e critical change introduced by the network was de-
centralized information production, including news and 
opinion, and the new opportunities for models based on 
neither markets nor the state for fi nancing to play a new 
and signifi cant role in the production of the public sphere. 
Th e Internet rapidly shifted from being primarily 
a research and education platform to a core element of 
our communications and information environment. Th e 
defi ning characteristic of the Net was the decentraliza-
tion of physical and human capital that it enabled. In 
1999, acute observers of the digital economy saw Encarta 
as the primary threat to Britannica in the encyclopedia 
market, and the epitome of what the new rules for the 
digital economy required. Th at a radically decentralized, 
non-proprietary project, in which no one was paid to 
write or edit and that in principle anyone could edit, 
would compete with the major encyclopedias was simply 
an impossibility. And yet, ten years later, Wikipedia was 
one of the top six or seven sites on the net, while Encarta 
had closed its doors. Peer production and other forms of 
commons-based, non-market production became a stable 
and important component of the information produc-
tion system. If the fi rst Gulf War was the moment of the 
twenty-four-hour news channel and CNN, then the Ira-
nian Reform movement of 2009 was the moment of ama-
teur video reportage, as videos taken by amateurs were 
uploaded to YouTube, and from there became the only 
signifi cant source of video footage of the demonstrations 
available to the major international news outlets. Most 
recently, the Tunisian revolt was in part aided by amateur 
videos of demonstrations, uploaded to a Facebook page 
of an activist, Lotfi  Hajji, and then retransmitted around 
the Arab world by Al Jazeera; and video taken by protest-
ers was mixed with that taken by professional journalists 
to depict the revolt in Egypt. But the networked public 
sphere is constructed of much more, and more diverse, 
organizational forms than ad hoc bursts of fully decen-
tralized activity.
Th e Emerging Networked Fourth Estate
As of the end of the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, 
it seems that the networked public sphere is constructed 
of several intersecting models of production whose opera-
tion to some extent competes with and to some extent 
complements each other. One central component of the 
new environment is comprised of core players in the mass 
media environment. However, these now have a global 
reach and have begun to incorporate decentralized ele-
ments within their own model. It is perhaps not surpris-
ing that CNN, the New York Times, NBC News and 
MSNBC News, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, the 
Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times are among 
the top-ranked news sites on the Internet. But alongside 
these are major international sites. Th e publicly-funded 
BBC and the U.K. nonprofi t the Guardian play a large 
role alongside U.S. commercial media. Th e Guardian’s 
editor-in-chief claimed to have 36 or 37 million readers 
per month, in comparison to the paper’s daily circulation 
of about 283,000. Th ese major players are, in turn, com-
plemented by the online presence of smaller traditional 
media platforms and sources from other countries, ac-
cessed by U.S. readers through Yahoo! and Google News, 
both among the top news sites in the world. Th e Wikile-
aks case presents quite well how central these large, global 
online news organizational players are, but it also shows 
how, because they are all in the same attention market, 
it is harder for any one of them to control access to the 
news. One of the strategically signifi cant moves that As-
sange made was precisely to harness these global mass 
media to his cause by providing them with enough exclu-
sivity in their respective national markets to provide them 
with economic benefi ts from publishing the materials, 
and enough competition in the global network to make 
sure that none of them could, if they so chose, bury the 
story. Th e global nature of the platform and the market 
made this strategy--by a small player with a signifi cant 
scoop--both powerful and hard to suppress.
Alongside the broader reach of these traditional out-
lets in a new medium, we are seeing the emergence of 
other models of organization, which were either absent 
or weaker in the mass media environment. Remaining, 
for a moment, within the sites visible enough to make 
major Internet rankings lists, the Huffi  ngton Post, a com-
mercial online collaborative blog, is more visible in the 
United States than any other news outlet except for the 
BBC, CNN, and the New York Times. Th ere are, of 
course, other smaller scale commercial sites that operate 
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on advertising. Th ese form a second element in the net-
worked public sphere. 
A third model that is emerging to take advantage of 
the relatively low cost of distribution, and the relatively 
low capital cost of production, of news is the nonprofi t 
sector. Here, I do not mean the volunteer, radically de-
centralized peer-production model, but rather the abil-
ity of more traditionally organized nonprofi ts to leverage 
their capabilities in an environment where the costs of 
doing business are suffi  ciently lower than they were in 
the print and television era that they can sustain eff ec-
tive newsrooms staff ed with people who, like academic 
faculties, are willing to sacrifi ce some of the bottom line 
in exchange for the freedom to pursue their professional 
values. One example is ProPublica, a foundation-sup-
ported model for an otherwise classic-style professional 
newsroom. A similar approach underlies the journalistic 
award-winning local reporting work of the Center for 
Independent Media, founded in 2006 and renamed in 
2010 the American Independent News Network. A re-
lated model is the construction of university-based cent-
ers that can specialize in traditional media roles. A perfect 
example of this is FactCheck.org, based in the Annenberg 
Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, 
which plays a crucial watchdog role in checking the verac-
ity of claims made by political fi gures and organizations.
Alongside these professional-journalism-focused 
nonprofi ts, we are seeing other organizations using a 
combination of standard nonprofi t organization with 
peer production to achieve signifi cant results in the public 
sphere. An excellent example of this model is off ered by 
the Sunlight Foundation, which supports both new laws 
that require government data to be put online, and the 
development of web-based platforms that allow people to 
look at these data and explore government actions that 
are relevant to them. Like Wikileaks did before the most 
recent events, Sunlight Foundation focuses on making 
the raw data available for the many networked eyes to 
read. Unlike Wikileaks, its emphasis is on the legal and 
formal release of government data and the construction 
of technical platforms to lower the cost of analysis and 
construct collaborative practices, so as to make it feasible 
for distributed social practices and people with diverse 
motivational profi les, embedded in diverse organizational 
models, to analyze the data.
In addition to the professionals based in large-scale 
global media, small-scale commercial media, high-end 
national and local nonprofi t media outlets, and other 
non-media nonprofi ts, we also see emerging a new party 
press culture. Over 10,000 Daily Kos contributors have 
strong political beliefs, and they are looking to express 
them and to search for information that will help their 
cause. So do the contributors to Townhall.com on the 
right, although the left-wing of the blogosphere uses large 
collaborative sites at this point in history more than the 
right. For digging up the dirt on your opponent’s corrup-
tion, political ambition and contestation is a powerful 
motivator, and the platforms are available to allow thou-
sands of volunteers to work together, with the leadership 
and support of a tiny paid staff  (paid, again, through 
advertising to this engaged community, or through mo-
bilized donations, or both).
Finally, although less discretely prominent than the 
large collaboration platforms like Daily Kos or Newsvine, 
and much more decentralized than any of the other mod-
els, individuals play an absolutely critical role in this new 
information ecosystem. First, there is the sheer presence 
of millions of individuals with the ability to witness and 
communicate what they witnessed over systems that are 
woven into the normal fabric of networked life. Th is is the 
story of the Iranian reform videos, and it is of course the 
story of much more mundane political reporting, from 
John McCain singing “Bomb Iran” to the tune of a Beach 
Boys song to George Allen’s Macaca. Second, there is the 
distributed force of observation and critical commentary, 
as we saw in the exposure of the error in the CBS/Dan 
Rather expose. Th ird, there are the experts. Collabora-
tive websites by academics, like Balkinization or Crooked 
Timber, provide academics with much larger distribu-
tion platforms to communicate, expanding the scope and 
depth of analysis available to policy and opinion makers.
Th e Wikileaks events need to be understood in the 
context of these broad trends in the construction of the 
networked fourth estate. Like the Sunlight Foundation 
and similar transparency-focused organizations, Wikile-
aks is a nonprofi t focused on bringing to light direct, 
documentary evidence about government behavior so 
that many others, professional and otherwise, can analyze 
the evidence and search for instances that justify public 
criticism. Like the emerging party presses, it acts out of 
political conviction. And like so many other projects on 
the Net, it uses a combination of volunteerism, global 
presence, and decentralized action to achieve its results. 
As such, Wikileaks presents an integral part of the net-
worked fourth estate--no less than the protesters who 
shoot videos on the streets of Tehran, Tunis, or Cairo and 
upload them to the Web. Whatever one thinks about the 
particular actions of Wikileaks in the particular instance 
of the release of the embassy cables, the organization and 
eff ort put forth by Wikileaks to bring to light actual 
internal government documents bearing on questions 
of great public import is essentially a networked version 
of the Pentagon Papers and Roosevelt’s Man with the 
Muck-Rake. An attack on Wikileaks--legal or extralegal, 
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technical or commercial--needs to be assessed from that 
perspective, and allows us to explore the limitations and 
strengths of the emerging networked fourth estate.
Mass Media Anxiety Played out in the Wikileaks Case 
Endangers the Networked Fourth Estate vis-a-vis the 
State, and Makes Cooperative Ventures Across the Di-
vide Challenging
Th e concern that the incumbent news industry has exhib-
ited in the past two years over the emerging competitors 
in the networked information environment was also on 
display in the way that American newspapers dealt with 
Wikileaks after the release of the embassy cables. Th is 
anxiety has two practical consequences. Th e fi rst is that 
the kind of cooperative venture that Wikileaks entered 
into with the major newspapers was clearly diffi  cult to 
manage. Th e cultural divide between established media 
players and the scrappy networked organizations that 
make up important parts of the networked fourth estate 
makes working together diffi  cult.
Th e second practical consequence is that, in seeking 
to preserve their uniqueness and identity, the traditional 
media are painting their networked counterparts into 
a corner that exposes them to greater risk of legal and 
extralegal attack. From a constitutional law perspective, 
the way in which the traditional media respond to, and 
frame, Wikileaks or other actors in the networked fourth 
estate does not matter a great deal. But from the practical 
perspective of what is politically and socially feasible for 
a government to do, given the constraints of public opin-
ion and the internalized norms of well-socialized elites 
in democratic countries, the more that newspapermen, 
in their eff ort to preserve their own identity, vilify and 
segregate the individuals and nontraditional components 
of the networked fourth estate, the more they put those 
elements at risk of suppression and attack through both 
legal and extralegal systems.
Collaboration Between Networked and Incumbent 
Models of Journalism
Th e events surrounding Wikileaks mark the diffi  culties 
with what will inevitably become a more broadly applica-
ble organizational model for the fourth estate. Th is new 
model will require increased integration between decen-
tralized networked and traditional professional models of 
information production, and concentration of attention.
On the production side, even looking narrowly at the 
question of leaks, whatever else happens, spinoff s from 
Wikileaks--OpenLeaks or BrusselsLeaks, eff orts by estab-
lished news organizations like Al-Jazeera and the New York 
Times to create their own versions of secure, online leaked 
document repositories--mark a transition away from the 
model of the leak to one trusted journalist employed by a 
well-established news organization. Th e advantages of this 
model to the person leaking the documents are obvious. 
A leak to one responsible organization may lead to non-
publication and suppression of the story. Wikileaks has 
shown that by leaking to an international networked or-
ganization able to deliver the documents to several outlets 
in parallel, whistleblowers can reduce the concern that the 
personal risk they take in leaking the document will be in 
vain. Major news organizations that want to receive these 
leaks will have to learn to partner with organizations that, 
like Wikileaks, can perform that function.
Leaking is, of course, but one of many ways in which 
news reporting can benefi t from the same distributed 
economics that drive open source development or Wiki-
pedia. Th e user-created images from the London Under-
ground bombing in 2005 broke ground for this model. 
Th ey were the only source of images. During the Iranian 
reform movement protests in 2009, videos and images 
created by users on the ground became the sole video 
feed for international news outlets, and by the time of 
the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings in early 2011, the 
integration of these feeds into mainline reporting had 
become all but standard. Just as in open source software 
“given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow,” a distrib-
uted population armed with cameras and video recorders, 
and a distributed population of experts and insiders who 
can bring more expertise and direct experience to bear on 
the substance of any given story, will provide tremendous 
benefi ts of quality, depth, and context to any story.
But the benefi ts are very clearly not only on the side of 
traditional media integrating distributed inputs into their 
own model. Looking specifi cally at Wikileaks and the 
embassy cables shows that responsible disclosure was the 
problem created by these documents that was uniquely 
diffi  cult to solve in an open networked model. Th e prob-
lem was not how to release them indiscriminately; that is 
trivial to do in the network. Th e problem was not how to 
construct a system for sifting through these documents 
and identifying useful insights. Protestations of the pro-
fessional press that simply sifting through thousands of 
documents and identifying interesting stories cannot be 
done by amateurs sound largely like protestations from 
Britannica editors that Wikipedia will never be an ac-
ceptable substitute for Britannica. At this stage of our 
understanding of the networked information economy, 
we know full well that distributed solutions can solve 
complex information production problems. It was the 
decision to preserve confi dentiality that made the usual 
approach to achieving large-scale tasks in the networked 
environment--peer production, large-scale distributed 
collaboration--unavailable. One cannot harness thou-
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sands of volunteers on an open networked platform to 
identify what information needs to be kept secret. To 
get around that problem, Wikileaks needed the partner-
ship with major players in the incumbent media system, 
however rocky and diffi  cult to sustain it turned out to be.
Another central aspect of the partnership between 
Wikileaks and its media partners was achieving salience 
and attention. Th ere is little doubt that mass media con-
tinues to be the major pathway to public attention in the 
United States, even as the role of Internet news consump-
tion rises. Debates continue as to the extent to which the 
agenda set through those organizations can, or cannot, be 
more broadly infl uenced today through non-mainstream 
media action. However important a subject, if it cannot 
ultimately make its way to mainstream media, it will 
remain peripheral to the mainstream of public discourse, 
at least for the intermediate future. Networked organiza-
tions need a partnership model with traditional organiza-
tions in large part to achieve salience.
As more mature sectors in which collaboration across 
the boundary between traditional organizational models 
and new networked models show, creating these collabo-
rations is feasible but not trivial. Open source software is 
the most mature of these, and it shows both the feasibility 
and complexity of the interface between more hierarchi-
cal and tightly structured models and fl at, networked, 
informal structures. Th e informality of loose networks 
and the safety of incumbent organizations draw diff er-
ent people, with diff erent personalities and values; work-
ing across these diff erences is not always easy. In looking 
at the Wikileaks case, it is diffi  cult to separate out how 
much of the diffi  culties in the interface were systemic 
and how much a function of interpersonal antipathy, As-
sange’s personality, and the Times’ ambivalence about 
working with Wikileaks. In thinking of the events as a 
case study, it is important not to allow these factors to 
obscure the basic insights: collaboration is necessary, it is 
mutually benefi cial, and it is hard.
Th e networked fourth estate will be made up of such 
interaction and collaboration, however diffi  cult it may 
be initially. Th e major incumbents will continue to play 
an important role as highly visible, relatively closed or-
ganizations capable of delivering much wider attention 
to any given revelation, and to carry on their operations 
under relatively controlled conditions. Th e networked 
entrants, not individually, but as a network of diverse 
individuals and organizations, will have an agility, scope, 
and diversity of sources and pathways such that they will, 
collectively, be able to collect and capture information 
on a global scale that would be impossible for any single 
traditional organization to replicate by itself. Established 
news outlets fi nd this partnership diffi  cult to adjust to. 
Bloggers have been complaining for years that journalists 
pick up their stories or ideas without giving the kind of at-
tribution they would normally give to journalists in other 
established organizations. But just as software companies 
had to learn to collaborate with open source software 
developers, so too will this industry have to develop its in-
teractions. We already see outlets like the Guardian well 
ahead of the curve, integrating what are eff ective expert 
blogs into their online platform as part of their menu of of-
ferings. We see the BBC successfully integrating requests 
for photographs and stories from people on the ground in 
fast-moving news situations--although not quite yet solv-
ing the problem of giving the sources a personality and 
voice of a collaborative contributor. One would assume 
that the networked components of the fourth estate will 
follow the same arc that Wikipedia has followed: from 
something that simply isn’t acknowledged, to a joke, to a 
threat, to an indispensable part of life.
Conclusion
A study of the events surrounding the Wikileaks docu-
ment releases in 2010 provides a rich set of insights about 
the weaknesses and sources of resilience of the emerg-
ing networked fourth estate. It marks the emergence of 
a new model of watchdog function, one that is neither 
purely networked nor purely traditional, but is rather a 
mutualistic interaction between the two. It identifi es the 
peculiar risks to, and sources of resilience of, the net-
worked fourth estate in a multidimensional system of 
expression and restraint, and suggests the need to resolve 
a major potential vulnerability--the ability of private in-
frastructure companies to restrict speech without being 
bound by the constraints of legality, and the possibility 
that government actors will take advantage of this af-
fordance in an extralegal public-private partnership for 
censorship. Finally, it off ers a richly detailed event study 
of the complexity of the emerging networked fourth es-
tate, and the interaction, both constructive and destruc-
tive, between the surviving elements of the traditional 
model and the emerging elements of the new. It teaches 
us that the traditional, managerial-professional sources of 
responsibility in a free press function imperfectly under 
present market conditions, while the distributed models 
of mutual criticism and universal skeptical reading, so 
typical of the Net, are far from powerless to deliver ef-
fective criticism and self-correction where necessary. Th e 
future likely is, as the Guardian put it, “a new model 
of co-operation” between surviving elements of the tra-
ditional, mass-mediated fourth estate, and its emerging 
networked models. Th e transition to this new model will 
likely be anything but smooth.
